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ABSTRACT 
Terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analysis and information 
dissemination would be improved and enhanced by including a medical and 
health element in law enforcement intelligence fusion centers. The lack of 
medical representation and participation in intelligence analysis and information 
dissemination has been an obstacle to effective terrorism prevention, 
preparedness and response. Terrorist acts, including weapons of mass 
destruction, would have a significant and profound impact on the medical and 
health community. The medical and health community should work more closely 
with the intelligence community and be privy to terrorism-related information and 
alerts. The three areas of implementation to be examined include the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, state level fusion centers and local (city, county, regional) 
terrorism early-warning groups. The Terrorism Liaison Officer Program will be 
examined as an option for medical personnel to become involved in anti-
terrorism efforts. Literature on the subject shows overwhelming support for the 
involvement of non-law enforcement public safety representation, including the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
If we can really understand the problem, the answer will come out 
of it, because the answer is not separate from the problem.  
– Jiddu Krishnamurti 
Intelligence gathering, analysis and information dissemination related to 
anti-terrorism efforts would be improved by the inclusion of medical and health 
representation in intelligence fusion centers. The lack of medical participation in 
intelligence analysis and information dissemination is an obstacle to effective 
terrorism prevention, preparedness and response.1 Literature on the subject 
shows overwhelming support for the involvement of non-law enforcement public 
safety representation, including the medical and health communities, in 
intelligence fusion centers.  
While a few state fusion centers and local terrorism early warning groups 
have recently augmented their programs with medical personnel, most do not. 
Many authorities agree that systems must be initiated to facilitate sharing 
between groups with responsibilities that include public safety. According to the 
9/11 Commission recommendations, “Information procedures should provide 
incentives for sharing to restore a better balance between security and shared 
knowledge.”2 Information sharing has greatly improved within the law 
enforcement community following the attacks of 9/11; yet, most non-law 
enforcement emergency response agencies, including emergency medical 
services and public health, remain excluded from intelligence analysis and timely 
                                            
1 Jay C. Butler, “Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New 
Partnership for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infections Diseases, Vol. 8, No. 
10 (2002) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/pdf/02-0400.pdf (accessed 12/01/06). 
2 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2004), 417.  
2 
information dissemination. Informal networks have been established, but these 
efforts are not sufficient. Therefore, terrorism prevention and response continues 
to be impeded by the lack of integration between the law 
enforcement/intelligence community and public safety, including emergency 
medical, hospital and public health response systems. 
The medical and health community includes many disciplines and 
specialties. For the purposes of this research, the “health community” is defined 
as those working in the general medical and public health profession, including 
physicians, nurses, public health practitioners (epidemiologists, health officers, 
infection control practitioners, public health nurses etc.) and medical lab workers. 
The “medical community” includes hospital practitioners, emergency department 
physicians, nurses, technicians and field emergency medical practitioners 
(Emergency Medical Technicians, Paramedics). Fire department emergency 
medical personnel are included as part of this research, but not the fire 
department as a whole, as their primary mission is not “medical”. The focus of 
this research is on those people and groups whose duties are primarily medically 
oriented, and their integration with intelligence and law enforcement fusion 
centers. 
The emergency medical and public health communities have significant 
roles in the safety and protection of United States citizens. As such, these 
organizations are crucial to terrorist attack prevention, preparedness and 
response systems.  
It is proper that these organizations be privy to intelligence products: 
information flow from intelligence directly affects its service to the public. The use 
of chemical, biological, radiological and explosive weapons would have a 
profound impact on the entire healthcare system. Since these organizations are 
directly involved in all aspects of response to a terrorist attack, they should have 
as much advance warning and information related to terrorism as possible. 
However, there is no comprehensive information dissemination system for 
emergency medical responders, hospitals or public health.  
3 
Security protocols limit the flow of information to the medical and health 
community. For instance, the release of classified or law enforcement sensitive 
information is complicated by the need for security clearances in Terrorism Task 
Forces or so called “Terrorism Fusion Centers.”  
There are many terms used to denote centers focused on law 
enforcement and multi-agency terrorism intelligence collaboration. Some 
common examples include: Terrorism Task Force, Terrorism Early Warning 
Group, Intelligence Fusion Center, Interagency Intelligence Analysis Center and 
Terrorism Working Group. For simplicity and purposes of this research, state 
sponsored and controlled intelligence and law enforcement centers will be 
referred to as “state fusion centers”. City, county or regional law enforcement 
intelligence centers that have an anti-terrorism mission will be referred to as 
“Terrorism Early Warning Group” (TEWG).  The general term “fusion center” will 
be used as a catch-all term to describe all levels (federal, state, regional and 
local) of government law enforcement anti-terrorism intelligence centers. 
Although an unofficial pipeline of information sharing exists between those 
in law enforcement and the medical community, a better system is necessary. 
Minimally, plans should be in place to ensure timely dissemination of terrorist 
threat warnings. The medical community has become more aggressive in 
procuring information. However, information is usually obtained at the same time 
that it is made publicly available. This makes it less actionable.    
There is much that medical and health professionals can offer the 
intelligence analysis process. Terrorism prevention is complex and demanding 
work. As such, a multi-disciplinary approach increases the likelihood of success. 
Trained intelligence analysts are well-versed in general knowledge and 
techniques, but typically have limited medical, pharmaceutical, or health training. 
Yet, medical understanding can be crucial. For instance, much of the language of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is medical in nature.  
4 
As a comparison, one would think it absurd not to have an Arab specialist 
addressing Arab-specific issues. Al Qaeda uses the history, language, and 
societal norms of the Arab culture to communicate. Therefore, analysts who are 
familiar with the Arab culture are rightfully involved in the intelligence analysis 
process.  
In fact, many subject matter experts are employed by intelligence 
agencies for specialized aspects of investigations. For example, financial 
analysts are used to scrutinize “money trails” in investigations related to 
terrorism.  
Medical adepts are a natural addition to the analytical team. They offer 
unique, specific intelligence and are privy to a wide variety of international 
medical issues and information related to disease. International health concerns, 
disease outbreak and suspicious illness reports are important matters of medical 
intelligence and should be brought into the greater intelligence cell for 
comparative and in-depth analysis.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is there a way to substantively involve the medical and health community 
in the intelligence and law enforcement fusion center efforts? Can a system be 
developed that offers medical expertise to intelligence analysis? Can channels 
be created to allow intelligence officials to liaise efficiently with the healthcare 
and the emergency medical community? While there is wide support for multi-
disciplinary, multi-agency involvement in intelligence fusion centers and local 
terrorism early warning groups, medical representation has been integrated in 
only a few intelligence fusion centers. Many changes are necessary to 
incorporate the medical disciplines into the intelligence fusion process. 
The research will examine the validity of medical and health 
representation in intelligence fusion centers. Precedence for information sharing 
set by previous models will be reviewed. The value to the intelligence and health 
5 
communities will be evaluated. Potential policy options for smoothly incorporating 
the medical community into fusion centers will be explored. Federal, state and 
local law enforcement intelligence centers will be examined. Specifically, the FBI 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), state intelligence fusion centers, 
local/regional terrorism early warning groups and local Terrorism Liaison Officer 
(TLO) Programs will be evaluated for the most appropriate integration of a 
medical and/or health representative. 
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE  
This research may help create a new paradigm for information sharing 
among the intelligence, law enforcement and medical and health communities. 
With it, new precedence may be set for collaboration between law 
enforcement/intelligence agencies and healthcare organizations such as public 
health, hospital groups and Emergency Medical Services (EMS).  
The appointment of healthcare representation to FBI JTTFs, intelligence 
fusion centers and TEWGs should not only increase the quality and timeliness of 
information sharing, but also benefit the FBI and other law enforcement agencies 
in their work. Bringing a medical and health expert into the intelligence analysis 
process would increase the capabilities of the intelligence process.  
With the well-accepted Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, medical and 
health professionals can help increase the number of observers and intelligence 
collectors in the community. Since medical professionals are immersed in the 
communities they serve, they can be utilized as additional “eyes and ears” in the 
war on terrorism. 
The audience of this research will be the broad law enforcement and 
intelligence community, public health officials and emergency medical service 
decision-makers. It will be made available for review to any decision-makers in 




This research includes a comprehensive analysis of academic, medical, 
law enforcement and popular literature. Surveys were conducted throughout the 
country. Geared toward ascertaining accurate information about membership in 
fusion centers, the surveys were administered to FBI JTTFs, state intelligence 
fusion centers, local terrorism early warning groups and other similar agencies. 
Results identified fusion centers with medical representatives and helped 
determine what specific medical disciplines are represented. Issues of 
qualification, selection, security clearance, training and time commitment were 
included. Research focused on the presence and functionality of medical 
representation in an intelligence fusion center.  
As part of the survey process, interviews were conducted to learn the 
opinions, insight and recommendations of experts working in the field. Interview 
subjects included members of law enforcement, intelligence, public health and 
emergency medical fields.   
Two major categories were examined to evaluate proposed policy options: 
political/agency support and practical feasibility. Thus far, research has shown 
wide endorsement for more comprehensive inclusion of health representation 
into the fusion center matrix. However, it would be crucial to the success of the 
program that members of intelligence, law enforcement and public health 
demonstrate active and ongoing support. With all parties supporting greater 
medical inclusion, a smooth transition is possible. To this end, a compilation of 
the opinions from the interviews and surveys was used to refine the proposal and 
assist with potential implementation. 
Even with financial, political and agency support, design and 
implementation of the solution programming must be feasible. Fusion centers 
with medical or healthcare representative were asked to comment on the value 
added by having such membership. Specific suggestions for implementation of 
medical and health representation in fusion centers are included. 
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E. REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
The literature review examined government documents such as the 9/11 
Commission Report, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Fusion Center Guidelines, the National Security Strategy of the 
United States, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Commission on 
Intelligence Capabilities and testimony to Congress from FBI Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTF) representatives. A comprehensive analysis of law 
enforcement, public health and medical trade journals that address intelligence 
and law enforcement relations is also included. After Action Reports (AAR) from 
several multi-agency terrorism exercises were also evaluated for their useful 
recommendations.  
Much can be gleaned from the full-scale, multi-agency exercise called 
“Golden Guardian-2004.” This exercise took place in California. It included over 
80 public safety agencies and over 1,000 participants. The exercise was 
coordinated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Office for 
Domestic Preparedness and the California National Guard. EMS, local hospitals 
and public health agencies were all active participants. The “Golden Guardian 
2004” official After Action Report had this specific recommendation: 
Public health needs representation in the JTTFs, so they can be 
better prepared for responding to a WMD event. Public health 
officials should identify representation and obtain a security 
clearance so passing information to them will be without incident. 
Building relationships with law enforcement officials will also help 
public health be more involved in the circle of information as well as 
helping others understand the importance public health plays in 
WMD incidents.3 
The literature supports the inclusion of medical and health representation 
in intelligence fusion centers at all levels of government. Most authorities agree 
that state fusion centers, FBI JTTFs, local TEWGs and national intelligence 
                                            
3 U.S Department of Homeland Security, After Action Report: “Golden Guardian 2004,” 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (2004).  
8 
centers should have local and state multi-disciplinary, multi-agency 
representation, including public safety. Moreover, many authorities have 
identified inadequate information sharing and dissemination as a significant 
obstacle to effective terrorism prevention. James Carafano of the Heritage 
Foundation suggested that state and local representation in the intelligence 
analysis process is necessary and should be implemented without delay.4  
Literature suggests that the medical, public health and general healthcare 
community should have an increased role in law enforcement anti-terrorism 
efforts and intra-agency collaboration.  
The call for medical collaboration with fusion centers is documented in 
many publications from the medical and law enforcement communities. For 
instance, in an October 2002 article of Emerging Infectious Diseases titled 
“Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms 
and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” the author addresses 
issues raised in the management of the then recent anthrax releases. In the 
report, the importance of good relationships between public health agencies and 
the FBI was highlighted. Dr. Jay Butler stressed that “partnerships between 
public health and law enforcement is a prerequisite to sound bioterrorism 
planning and response.”5 He continued by stressing the importance of training 
and systems integration as part of national preparation for possible disasters:  
Thus, public health and law enforcement need to increase mutual 
collaboration and understanding before they are thrown together in 
response to a biological attack. To this end, liaison personnel are  
needed who have some degree of cross-training in the public 
health aspects of communicable diseases and in law enforcement 
and criminal investigations.6 
                                            
4 James J. Carafano, “Terrorist Intelligence Centers Need Reform Now,” The Heritage 
Foundation (2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em930.cfm/ (accessed 
1/15/07). 
5 Butler 1155. 
6 Butler 1155. 
9 
The complexity of the investigation of the 2001 Anthrax release 
necessitated collaboration between law enforcement and public health. The 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) worked closely with the FBI on this inquiry. 
Their joint effort catalyzed knowledge that was immediately recognized for its 
national benefit. Since then, a CDC medical representative has had a permanent 
assignment at FBI headquarters to liaise between the healthcare community and 
the law enforcement network.7 This is a clear indicator that medical and health 
involvement with law enforcement and intelligence centers is critical and 
practical.  
Two months before 9/11, the CDC, as part of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, emphasized the importance of a strong partnership with 
the FBI JTTFs both before and after a terrorist event.8   
Although officials in state and local government feel there have been 
some improvements in information dissemination, there is general agreement 
that further enhancements are necessary. Jim McKay, of Government 
Technology magazine, made the following observation:  
Changes [in information dissemination] include improving the way 
information is shared with state and local officials -- which has 
improved somewhat since 9/11, with the advent of the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) and as a result of Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces. But, officials charged with protecting local 
communities continue to express frustration that intelligence is too 
often tardy and lacking detail by the time it reaches states.9  
In August of 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) released a comprehensive document called Fusion 
Center Guidelines: Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at 
the Local, State, and Federal Level. An earlier version of this document focused 
                                            
7 Butler 1155.  
8 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The Public Health Response to Biological 
and Chemical Terrorism: Interim Guidelines,” CDC (2001): 79. 
9 Jim McKay, “The Security Shuffle,” Government Technology (2005),   
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/channel_story.php/97157 (accessed 11/15/06).  
10 
on law enforcement being the primary “driver” of fusion centers and suggested 
the involvement of public safety and private sector representatives as an option. 
The updated version of this document emphasizes that the critical mission of 
fusion centers is not complete without comprehensive inclusion of public safety, 
including EMS, public health and the greater medical community. The document 
stresses that public safety can bring quality analytical expertise into the fusion 
center process, as well as increase the number of “intelligence collectors” within 
the community. It also emphasizes that the ability to disseminate and share 
information would be enhanced with the inclusion of public safety disciplines.  
Public safety partners should be incorporated into all phases of the 
intelligence/fusion process. Entities within this sector represent 
nontraditional information gatherers and can provide fusion centers 
with both strategic and tactical information, including crime-related 
trends (e.g., prescription drug fraud and fire investigations); 
additional response capabilities (fire and hazmat); and suspicious 
activity (e.g., unusual diseases reported at hospitals). Public safety 
entities should also be included in the dissemination and evaluation 
phases.10 
The National Governors Associations (NGA) Center for Best Practices 
weighed in on this topic with an Issue Brief: Establishing State Intelligence 
Fusion Centers. Once again, the expansion of fusion center participation beyond 
law enforcement was recommended. They highlighted Arizona, Maryland and 
Georgia as good models of state fusion centers that fully embrace other public 
safety disciplines. In fact, Maryland’s fusion center mission statement includes  
language specific to the issue: “for the analysis and dissemination of information 
in statewide support of law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety 
and homeland security.” 
The NGA Issue Brief had the following recommendation: 
To achieve the cross-functionality necessary for a successful fusion 
center, states should ensure that the center integrates staff from 
                                            
10 United States Department of Justice, “Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion 
Centers at the Local, State and Federal Levels,” United States Department of Justice (2006). 
11 
diverse agencies, including public safety, public health, energy, 
transportation, technology, the state national guard, etc. Although 
all state agencies do not need to be part of an IFC, the centers 
should have provision to incorporate, as needed, liaisons from 
agencies with homeland security interests.11 
Finally, the December 2005 Department of Homeland Security’s Lessons 
Learned: Information Sharing found that local and state officials, as well as the 
private sector, would prefer a more inclusive homeland security framework that 
expands beyond the model predominantly in practice in which leadership 
consists of law enforcement exclusively. It is clear that law enforcement agencies 
should play the central role in any anti-terrorism, homeland security and 
intelligence sharing efforts. However, the efficacy of intelligence fusion centers 
would be enhanced by the inclusion of public safety disciplines such as public 
health, emergency medical services, fire and private sector entities. The DHS 
official recommendation is as follows: 
DHS should support the expansion of homeland security 
intelligence sharing and analyst training to include all public safety 
and works disciplines, including critical private sector entities. The 
department should continue to encourage initiatives that promote a 
multi-disciplinary approach to information and intelligence sharing 
and fusion, such as the HSAC, Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, and the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Expansion 
Projects.12 
The FBI and law enforcement intelligence fusion centers are increasingly 
focused on prevention of terrorist acts. To this end, new partnerships with 
emergency medical services and public health are required. Intelligence 
information flowing into fusion centers are sorted by filters from various fields; but 
typically, none of the analysts have a medical perspective. Those well-versed in 
medical knowledge, WMD expertise and public health matters would greatly 
                                            
11 National Governors Association, NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief, “Establishing 
State Intelligence Fusion Centers” (2005), http://www.nga.org (accessed 1/17/07). 
12 LLIS, “Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence 
Requirements Process” (2005), http://www.llis.gov (accessed 1/15/07). 
12 
assist law enforcement in distinguishing genuine security threats from false ones, 
especially those pertaining to communicable diseases and bio-terrorism.   
Literature from government, law enforcement and medical journals and 
popular circulations indicate support for the inclusion of public safety in the 
intelligence fusion process. Even with strong recommendations and support, 
most fusion centers have not attained the level of multi-agency, multi-discipline 
collaboration requested. Without mandates, these recommendations can only 
identify best practices and goals, but not assure that they are implemented.  
13 
II. TERRORISM THREAT TO AMERICA 
This is not jihad. This is strictly business. 
 – Essam al Ridi 
A. CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS 
Intelligence analysts warn that an attack on American soil using weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) is possible. While some say a crisis of this sort is 
probable, others argue it is inevitable. Regardless of the estimated likelihood of a 
WMD event, the medical and health community must do everything feasible to 
prevent and prepare for an act of terrorism resulting in casualties. 
Without terrorist threat, the significance of the research question is 
diminished. However, current popular and academic literature indicates that the 
threat of terrorism, especially that by extreme Islamic groups, has not passed 
and may be increasing. For the purposes of this research, it is important to 
explore the nature of the terrorist threat, including terrorists groups, ideology, 
tactics and preferred weapons. The implications of chemical, radiological, 
biological and explosive attack must be assessed to gauge the medical system’s 
preparation for effective response.  
The medical community can be employed in the prevention of terrorism if 
it has proper training and communications systems in place. For instance, the 
medical community is equipped to rapidly identify an early indication of a 
bioterrorist attack. It may be able to identify terrorist planning activities by 
tracking injuries or illnesses that suggest a terrorism nexus. Therefore, a more 
robust relationship between the medical community and law enforcement is 
required.  
Evidence shows Al Qaeda and affiliated groups continue to look for 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the United States. Many experts 
14 
throughout the world believe that America will be targeted in the near future. 
Daniel Pipes, author of numerous books and articles, is the director of the Middle 
East Forum, a think tank on Middle East policy. He commented that terrorism 
from Islamic groups extends to the US:  
So, let the warning be clear: Militant Islam seeks to destroy the 
United States (as well as Europe, Israel, and many other societies) 
as presently constituted. Islamists have shown resolve, tenacity, 
and tactical brilliance. Unless Westerners take this threat very 
much to heart, Islamists will be back, dispensing far worse 
punishments.13 
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden called for a new fatwa “for 
Muslims to kill Americans and Jews everywhere in the world.”14 He also has 
commanded that civilian and military American targets are to be attacked 
wherever and whenever the opportunity exists. It is not an alarmist view to 
assume that it is only a matter of time before we are faced with another terrorist 
attack on American soil. The potential attack could take any number of forms, 
such as suicide bombing, biological agent release, chemical attack, radiological 
dispersion device, or even nuclear attack.  
Both authorities and terrorism experts are concerned that Al Qaeda is 
seeking nuclear weapons and developing plans to use them. “Unless [the Bush 
Administration] changes course—and fast—a nuclear terrorist attack on the 
United States will be more likely than not in the decade ahead” states Graham 
Allison, a professor at the Kennedy School of Government.15 Plans for the use of 
nuclear weapons have been substantiated by alarming intelligence. According to 
a report in 1994, evidence shows that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden 
                                            
13 Daniel Pipes, “The Attacks Were Part of Militant Islam’s War Against America,” The Attack 
On America: September 11, 2001, ed. James D. Torr (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2002). 
14 Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorist Living Among Us (New York: Free Press, 
2002) 149. 
15 Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism Is the Greatest Threat to National Security,” What Are 
the Most Serious Threats to Homeland Security, ed. James D. Torr (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 
2005) 14. 
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attempted to obtain nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan and showed interest in 
procuring several other forms of weapons of mass destruction.16 
The war in Iraq has inflamed anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. 
This war has been associated with a significant increase in suicide attacks 
worldwide. Respected author and researcher Robert Pape stated, “The longer 
American combat forces remain in the country [Iraq], the greater the risk that 
Iraqi suicide terrorists will seek to mount operations to kill Americans in the 
United States.”17 Scott Atran, a terrorism expert from the University of Michigan, 
commented on the subject in an ABC News report: 
Using humans as bombs has gained in popularity over the last 
couple of years. From 2002 to 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks 
killed more than 5,300 people in 17 countries and wounded 
thousands, according to Atran, adding that more and more are 
religiously motivated. The numbers have drastically increased with 
the Iraqi insurgency opting for suicide bombing as the weapon of 
choice.18 
In the same report, Bruce Newsome of the RAND Corporation discussed 
the July 2005 London suicide bombings. He said that the incident is a “likely 
model for future attacks on the U.S.”19 He observed that the suicide bombers in 
London were difficult to identify before the bombings; every offender was a 
legitimate citizen with no known contact or history with extremists. As “ordinary,” 
middle-class Muslims, they had only recently become radical extremists willing to 
act violently on their beliefs.  
                                            
16 Surinder Rana, “Comparing Threats from Saddam and bin Laden,” Strategic Insight, Vol. 
1, No. 7, (2002) http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast3.asp (accessed 11/15/06). 
17 Robert Pape, Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005). 
18 Charlotte Sector, “Experts Say Suicide Mission in United States Is Inevitable,” ABC News, 
(2005) http://www.abcnews.go.com/International/print?id=942343 (accessed 12/12/06). 
19 Sector 2005. 
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Many of the known actions of both international and domestic terrorists 
indicate that biological, chemical and explosive weapons have been used in the 
past and more attacks are likely being planned.20  
Law enforcement counter-terrorism efforts have prevented potential 
attacks in America. While evidence suggests there are active terrorist cells in 
America, some alleged cells have been disrupted in New York City, Buffalo, 
Portland, Detroit and several cities in California. There have been over 200 
suspected terrorists arrested in the United States since 9/11.21 The fusion center 
concept has facilitated greater sharing of information related to terrorism, which 
has led to arrests and deportation of terrorist suspects. The inclusion of medical 
and health representatives into the intelligence fusion process would help in the 
collection and dissemination of such information.  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM FOR THE MEDICAL AND HEALTH 
COMMUNITY 
With any terrorist act, the emergency medical, hospital and public health 
system would be significantly impacted, especially an attack resulting in mass 
casualties or the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). If bioterrorist 
agents such as plague, anthrax or smallpox were released, it would require a 
combined and coordinated effort from the entire national medical community. The 
health system would need to work collaboratively with law enforcement, 
emergency management and many others in the public safety realm to effectively 
respond and recover.  
Terrorist attacks come in two distinct forms: covert and overt. The role and 
function of the medical and health community is somewhat determined by the 
following categories of terrorist attack. 
 
                                            
20 Sector 2005.  
21 Daniel Wood, “US Arrests Renew Terror Concerns,” Christian Science Monitor, (2005) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0610/p01s01-usgn.html (accessed 10/22/06). 
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1. Overt Terrorist Attacks 
Overt attacks are typically unannounced, often “explosive” events. Overt 
acts are by far the most common type of attacks by terrorists. Explosives are the 
preferred weapon of choice, delivered as suicide missions or using improvised 
explosive devices (IED) placed in cars or trucks. Less commonly, overt attacks 
involve intentional chemical release or an announced release of a biological 
agent. Usually, overt terrorist acts are immediately high profile. They require 
rapid law enforcement, fire, haz-mat, EMS and hospital involvement.  
2. Covert Terrorist Attacks 
Conversely, covert events are unannounced. These are “quiet” releases; a 
victim’s exposure to a dangerous substance is discovered only after symptoms of 
illness become apparent. Covert ambush may be chemical, radiological or 
biological in form.  
Usually, covert terrorist attacks are detected first by the medical 
community. For instance, if a communicable disease such as plague or smallpox 
were released, it would be recognized by the victim’s healthcare provider. A 
bioterrorist agent release such as anthrax would be noticed the same way. 
Suspicious diseases are routinely reported to public health as mandated by law. 
This means that clinics, hospitals, labs and the public health department would 
probably be the first to identify an attack. Many specific diagnoses are reportable 
to local public health within designated timeframes, including some that could 
indicate terrorist actions.  
Such information should then be passed on to local law enforcement and 
the FBI. However, the limited precedence for such information flow threatens to 
cause delays in response to covert attacks and other unfortunate outcomes. For 
instance, the anthrax release of 2001 was first identified by an astute physician 
who managed to convince local law enforcement that a possible crime had been  
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committed. If the medical community had stronger prior relationships with law 
enforcement, then it is reasonable to surmise that notification and corrective 
action may have taken place earlier. 
3. Impact of Terrorism on the Medical and Health Community 
Local public health departments have broad powers to contain and control 
diseases. The legal authority to close businesses, quarantine groups and 
individuals and force medical treatment lies neither with law enforcement nor with 
the fire department. Only the local Health Officer has the power to make such 
mandates on behalf of the community.  
Public health departments are responsible for the coordination and 
distribution of medicines for the community in cases where mass prophylaxis is 
necessary. Therefore, any bioterrorist communicable disease released into the 
community would require the expertise of local, state and federal medical 
experts. Depending on the nature of the event, the FBI, public health department, 
medical and rescue communities have overlapping responsibilities in protecting 
lives, investigating the agent involved and containing the outbreak.  
Many people in the emergency medical system, such as Emergency 
Medical Technicians and Paramedics, work in stressful and sometimes 
dangerous conditions on a daily basis. Terrorist actions put rescuers at risk. EMS 
personnel are typically the first medical responders to an event. Terrorists have 
been known to target first responders directly, sometimes employing the 
diabolical tactic of detonating secondary explosive devices.  
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) stands ready in all communities to 
respond to any and all events where the injured or sick need care. Generally, 
EMS has a robust surge capacity enabling them to increase the number of 




may discover early indicators of terrorist activities by observing suspicious 
behavior by patients or by identifying illness or injury patterns commiserate with 
terrorist planning activities or WMD agents.  
The majority of injured eventually report to area hospitals. Any increase in 
the number of patients arriving at medical facilities stresses the entire healthcare 
system. Most hospitals in America typically operate at close to 100% capacity, 
with little physical space or additional staff to handle an increase in patient 
surge.22 Hospitals are not well-suited to deal with an influx of victims from a 
chemical or biological attack.23 Moreover, hospitals are vulnerable to direct 
terrorist acts themselves. For instance, Muslim Chechen rebels have been 
known to target hospitals and take hostages from within medical facilities.  
While much has improved in terrorism preparedness and response since 
9/11, there has been little progress in “hardening” hospitals, or decreasing their 
vulnerability to terrorism. The medical community has no comprehensive early 
warning or threat notification system. Hospitals and the public health system 
typically take hours or days to rally resources and prepare for an increase of 
victims. For these reasons, the likely medical response to an unannounced 
terrorist attack would no doubt be chaotic, overwhelming and woefully 
insufficient. 
                                            
22 Julie Kliger, RN, MPA, healthcare and patient safety expert, interviewed by author, 
December 7, 2006. 
23 D.C. Wetter et al., “Hospital Preparedness for Victims of Chemical or Biological Terrorism,” 
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III. INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS 




The intelligence fusion center concept originated prior to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. In the 1990s, some law enforcement agencies co-located with 
other local, state and federal agencies to share information in order to create a 
more accurate intelligence picture about criminal activity. While there were some 
successes, the intelligence community and law enforcement were not sharing 
information in any substantive way before 9/11. The 9/11 Commission called this 
“human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”24 Following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, intelligence fusion centers with an anti-terrorism mission were 
created at the federal, state and local level based on the impetus and 
recommendations of governmental reports.  
Fusion centers were designed to break down barriers between various law 
enforcement agencies and the intelligence sector. They promote information 
sharing and inter-agency and inter-disciplinary collaboration. The focus of fusion 
centers is to embrace intelligence-led policing, collaboration and networking with 
other law enforcement, public safety and private sector partners. Fusion centers 
attempt to create intelligence products of local value to its customers, law 
enforcement and others involved in anti-terrorism efforts. 
 
 
                                            
24 Hamilton 416. 
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As of March 2006, thirty-one states had some version of a fusion center in 
operation. Most operate only during standard office hours. Eight states had 
chosen not to create a fusion center at that time.25 Eleven states are currently 
developing a fusion center.  
The majority of state fusion centers are primarily managed and staffed 
with law enforcement representatives. FBI JTTFs are also primarily staffed with 
law enforcement and military representatives. Only a few state fusion centers 
and FBI JTTFs have representation by other public safety disciplines. The 
Department of Justice’s Fusion Center Guidelines recommends a process of 
developing a true multi-disciplinary center with three phases. First, law 
enforcement establishes the center. Next, public safety agencies are included. 
Finally, private sector representatives join.26  
Given the Department of Justice’s guidelines, it is confounding that more 
public safety disciplines are not already working within the existing fusion 
centers. Surprisingly, the problem may originate within the fusion center 
guidelines. Law enforcement initially sets up the center, but specifications are not 
made to indicate when a program should expand to the second phase. 
Sometimes law enforcement officials may be reticent about opening up their 
center to other disciplines. It can take months or years to develop an effective 
center; if it is working well, law enforcement may be hesitant to introduce new 
factors into an already functional working dynamic.  
Yet, fusion centers that have medical and health representatives have 
reported only good results. The benefit of having a medical and health 
representative is missed by those centers that do not have this kind of  
 
                                            
25 State and Regional Intelligence Fusion Center Contact Information, National Criminal 
Intelligence Resource Center (2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/state.pdf (accessed 
1/22/07). 
26 United States Department of Justice, “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 
Information and Intelligence in a New Era” (2006), 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf (accessed 2/1/07). 
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configuration. It is possible that law enforcement and intelligence decision-
makers at fusion centers lacking medical representation simply do not know what 
they are missing.  
Law enforcement based intelligence fusion centers need to be made 
aware of the recommendations and suggestions from the myriad of government 
documents. Fusion centers need to reach out to the public safety community and 
invite them to participate. In addition, public safety entities need to approach 
fusion center mangers and request involvement in the process. 
At the local level, there are many exceptions to the law enforcement-only 
norm. Local fusion centers, usually called Terrorism Early Warning Groups 
(TEWG), sometimes have non-law enforcement public safety members, such as 
fire, public works, transportation and medical/health representatives. Some 
TEWGs include a medical component as part of their full or part-time cadre. 
These representatives tend to be field providers who are actively involved in 
patient care and hospital operations. 
B. SURVEY OF FUSION CENTERS 
As part of the research, survey questions were developed and 
administered to accurately determine the inclusion of medical and health 
representation within fusion centers. The following questions were asked: 
1) Does representation exist from the emergency medical and/or 
public health community in the fusion center? 
2) If yes: 
a) From what discipline(s) do they come? 
b) What level of medical practitioner are they? (MD, RN, EMT, 
other) 
c) Are they full-time, part-time or liaison? 
d) Do they have a security clearance? To what level? 
e) Did they receive training or orientation? If so, what kind? 
f) Has this initiative been well-received? Is it working well? 
Why? Why not? 
24 
3) If no: 
a) Has there been any discussion to include representation 
from the emergency medical and/or public health 
community? 
b) Is there interest to include medical and/or health 
representation? 
c) Have medical and/or health representatives been invited, but 
chose not to participate? 
d) Where does the fusion center go to get medical information? 
Does this system work? 
The surveys were sent out to twenty FBI JTTFs, twenty state and regional 
fusion centers, and fifteen local TEWGs.27 Interviews were conducted by 
telephone in some cases. 40% of the surveys were returned from FBI JTTFs, 
55% were returned from state fusion centers and 33% were returned from local 
TEWGs.  
JTTF survey findings were consistent with information generated by an 
internal FBI database listing all JTTF members according to city and agency.28 
An interesting pattern emerged, indicating that the centers more likely to return 
completed surveys were the same centers that had a medical or health 
representative. Telephone follow-ups on the survey recipients confirmed this 
observation.29  
C. FUSION CENTERS WITH MEDICAL/HEALTH REPRESENTATION 
Fusion centers that employ a medical or health representative consistently 
gave high marks for the value added to their endeavor. However, there was no 
standard in terms of which medical discipline or level of practitioner represents  
 
                                            
27 Local TEWG contact information was difficult to find. Multiple database searches were 
limited in identifying specific agencies. 
28 FBI internal database, not publicly available. 
29 It is the belief of this author that most, if not all, fusion centers with medical health 
representation were accounted for in the research process.  
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the medical field in these centers. At the few FBI JTTFs that have medical 
representation at all, the medical task force officers were fire or EMS-based 
paramedics (EMT-P).  
Most fusion centers have only one medical or health representative. While 
one representative is better than none, it may be short-sighted not to have back-
up medical personnel in times of crisis. Moreover, it could create concerns due to 
possibility of turnover.  
State fusion centers typically draw their health representation from the 
state health department. Registered nurses (RN) are their primary medical 
representative. The Georgia state fusion center uses a veterinarian as its medical 
representative.30  
Another interesting finding was the range in schedule and time 
commitment of the medical members. At all levels of government, most centers 
with medical representation commonly have their representatives working on a 
part-time basis: many only one day a week. The second most common model is 
that of a medical liaison, or an ad-hoc member that is contacted on an as-needed 
basis. Very few fusion centers have a full-time medical team member. The part-
time model seems to be a “smart practice” because the sponsoring agency does 
not lose their employee for an extended timeframe, yet they still benefit from 
inclusion in the fusion center.  
Fusion centers surveyed had various responses to the issue of security 
clearance. FBI JTTF members, including part-time medical representatives, are 
required to have Top Secret Clearance. At state and local centers, Top Secret 
Clearance is generally not required. The FBI has offered to provide Secret 
Security Clearance to local and state law enforcement officials to assist 
information sharing. Many full-time members of fusion centers have Secret Level 
Clearance.  
                                            
30 Lee Smith, Georgia Public Health Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, interview with 
author, January 10, 2007. 
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Orientation and training for medical members is markedly variable at 
federal, state and local fusion centers. The FBI offers a forty-hour JTTF training 
program available for non-FBI JTTF members, but medical representatives are 
not required to take it. The FBI JTTF model operates on an informal, on-the-job 
training basis. This stands in sharp contrast to approach taken by centers at the 
state level. Every state fusion center surveyed offered both orientation and 
ongoing training for all fusion center members. Some included intelligence 
analysis and risk/vulnerability assessment training. Most California TEWG 
medical and health representatives were required to take the state-approved 
forty-hour Terrorism Liaison Officer training.  
Based on the results of the survey information, it appears that a minimal 
level of training should be instituted as part of the general requirements for all 
fusion center members. The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center has 
an extensive training program that should be looked at as a model program. 
The survey shows that fusion centers at all levels of government inclusive 
of medical and health representation have addressed implementation issues in a 
wide range of ways. Categories, such as type of medical discipline, level of 
practitioner, security clearance and time commitment, are as varied as the 
centers themselves. However, what was found to be consistent in every survey 
and interview was the unwavering high marks given to the endeavor of medical 
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D. FUSION CENTERS WITHOUT MEDICAL/HEALTH REPRESENTATION  
Only twelve fusion centers returned surveys stating they have no medical 
and health representation. Telephone interviews were conducted with some 
fusion centers that did not return a completed survey. Each phone interview 
confirmed there was no medical or health representation within their fusion 
center. Web searches were conducted examining various fusion centers. Fusion 
center web sites generally showed their membership organizations and most 
showed no medical or health agencies as part of their network. 
At all levels of government, the majority of fusion centers are managed 
and staffed solely by members of law enforcement. A multi-disciplinary approach 
has only been embraced by a few state fusion centers and local TEWGs. Since 
fusion centers evolved from law enforcement inter-agency sharing efforts, it is 
reasonable that law enforcement agencies form the primary management.  
At the time of the research, a few state fusion centers and local TEWGs 
without medical or health representation were considering the addition of public 
safety members to their centers. When asked how the fusion center procures 
medical information without such members on staff, these centers responded 
that they have telephone contact with public health in their local area.  
Sometimes, law enforcement is hesitant to include “non-sworn” members 
into an intelligence fusion center. Historically, the medical community has had 
limited involvement in terrorism prevention, preparedness and intelligence 
analysis. The primary drivers of anti-terrorist intelligence efforts are law 
enforcement agencies; occasionally, they are resistant to changing that dynamic. 
Even though literature on the subject clearly shows broad support and strong 
recommendations for the inclusion of other public safety members in counter-
terrorism intelligence fusion centers, the level of multi-discipline collaboration is 
far from adequate.  
The lack of interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation could have 
many reasons. For instance, a markedly different institutional culture is found in 
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the law enforcement realm versus the medical field. Another obstacle to 
cooperation has been the lack of government security clearances to non-law 
enforcement individuals. Staffing costs are another impediment. The cost of 
personnel time may be a challenge to appointing a medical representative to law 
enforcement and intelligence centers. Hence, the healthcare community has 
typically been a consumer of only publicly available intelligence alerts. 
Members of the medical and health community can also be reluctant to 
become involved in the intelligence process. To many, collaboration with 
intelligence seems secondary to their primary healthcare mission. In one 
particular case, public health was asked to become a partner in a state fusion 
center and they chose not to participate.31  The exact reason for this is unclear; 
the fusion center, not the public health department in question, was interviewed 
for this research. 
                                            
31 Survey result from the Illinois State Counter Terrorism Center, January 2007. 
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Table 2.   Fusion Centers with No Medical/Health Representation 

























State  Yes, PH 
chose not 
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Yes Phone reach back 
to state PH 
South Carolina 
Fusion Center  
State  No No Phone contacts 
with PH 
Boston, MA FBI 
JTTF 
JTTF No Possible Unknown 
Los Angeles, CA  
FBI JTTF 
JTTF No No JRIC 
Atlanta, GA FBI 
JTTF 
JTTF No No Georgia State 
Fusion Center 
Portland, OR FBI 
JTTF 
JTTF No No Unknown 
Pittsburg, PA FBI 
JTTF 
JTTF No No  Unknown 
Rockland County 
Intelligence (NY) 
TEWG No No County PH 
City of New 
Orleans TEW 
TEWG No No Fire department 
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IV. FUSION CENTER MODELS 
A. FEDERAL AND NATIONAL MODELS 
For the purpose of this research, the scope of intelligence fusion centers 
will include a “convenience sampling”32 of military, federal, state and local fusion 
centers. The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, several state fusion centers and a 
number of local Terrorism Early Warning Groups are investigated and discussed. 
Many of these groups have full-time local, multi-agency, law enforcement 
partnerships working collaboratively to fight terrorism. A few have non-law 
enforcement public safety members as part of their staff. 
1. Department of Homeland Security 
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the 
direction of Secretary Michael Chertoff, realized the importance of having a full-
time medical presence at the highest level. In July 2005, Dr. Jeffery W. Runge 
was appointed as the first Chief Medical Officer for the DHS. In January 2007, 
the Office of the Chief Medical Officer was moved to the Office of Health Affairs 
in a restructuring of FEMA and DHS. The responsibilities of this position include 
bio-defense activity coordination, pandemic flu preparedness and uniting the 
national approach to medical planning and response. The Chief Medical Officer 
is the principle liaison to several organizations, including the Veterans 
Administration, state and local public health departments, the private medical 
sector and the Department of Health and Human Services.33 This important 
position highlights the concept that professional medical guidance is central to 
the response to terrorist and natural disaster.  
                                            
32 The sampling was mostly based on publicly available contact information and web 
searches, as well as personal contacts. 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Office of the Chief Medical Officer,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0880.shtm 
(accessed 1/12/07). 
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2. Military Medical Intelligence 
The military has a long history of integrated medical intelligence. In fact, 
the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) may prove a worthy 
model for FBI JTTF and state and local fusion centers to consider. Much of the 
AFMIC military focus can be translated into law enforcement intelligence counter-
terrorism missions.  
As part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the AFMIC monitors 
global health issues for the Department of Defense (DOD).34 This important 
mission is focused on global health issues, worldwide infectious disease trends, 
radiological, biological and chemical weapons and the medical implications of 
weapons of mass destruction.  
The AFMIC alerts military operations customers and policymakers on 
issues that affect national security and homeland defense. They support the 
global war on terror (GWOT) by providing environmental and medical capability 
intelligence, as well as predictive models of the medical response to WMD in 
military conflict areas. AFMIC has a secure website with international medical 
information and is planning to provide up-to-date instant alert functions via email 
in the near future.35  
This comprehensive intelligence mission has vast experience; it, therefore, 
offers a successful model for domestic intelligence centers, including the FBI 
JTTF, state fusion centers and local TEWGs, as well as others involved in anti-
terrorism efforts. The AFMIC’s notification system for communication with its 
constituents is remarkable. It should also be considered as a model for fusion 
centers. The institution of a “medical wing” in fusion centers would benefit by  
 
 
                                            
34 Lynn McNamee, “The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center,” Military Medical 
Technology (2006), http://www.military-medical-technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=703 
(accessed 1/8/07). 
35 McNamee 2006. 
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providing a focus on global and national medical issues and trends, as well as 
keeping abreast of medical technology and developments that may help in anti-
terrorism efforts.  
3. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
The FBI has found that by reaching out and including local, state and 
other federal law enforcement agencies “under one roof”, they are better able to 
have a successful anti–terrorism program. The information exchange within 
JTTFs maximizes interagency coordination to create a cohesive strategy to 
combat the threat of terrorism.  
The first JTTF was established in New York City in 1980. Now, there are 
56 JTTFs in the United States. Throughout the country, each FBI Field Office has 
an active JTTF within its jurisdictional area. The national mission of the JTTF is 
to “organize federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in a coordinated 
manner for the purpose of detecting, preventing and responding to domestic and 
international terrorist organizations and/or individuals who may threaten or attack 
United States citizens or interests abroad or conduct criminal activity within the 
United States.”36 
The San Francisco FBI JTTF has a successful outreach program that 
began in 1997. Currently, it is composed of 26 federal, state and local agencies. 
This JTTF is particularly well-equipped to do its job because it integrates national 
and international intelligence resources with state and local law enforcement 
street expertise and experience.  
Their wide range of participants includes the following federal agencies: 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Federal Protective Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 
                                            
36 Nevada Emergency Operations and Notification Network, 
http://www.neonn.org/index.cfm/MenuItemID/224.htm (accessed 1/15/07). 
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Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Coast Guard, the 
United States Department of State, the United States Department of Treasury, 
the United States Marshal's Service, the United States Customs Service, the 
United States Office of Export Enforcement, the United States Postal Service, 
and the United States Secret Service. Local agencies include the Alameda 
County Sheriff's Department, California Department of Justice, the California 
Highway Patrol, the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Department, the Oakland 
Police Department, the San Jose Police Department, the San Francisco Police 
Department, the San Mateo County Sheriff's Department, the Santa Clara 
County District Attorney's Office and the Santa Clara County Sheriff's 
Department.37  
Most Bay Area JTTF members have full or part-time assignments from 
their respective agencies to the FBI JTTF offices in Oakland, San Francisco or 
San Jose.  
Historically, the 56 JTTFs nationwide have been composed of law 
enforcement agencies responsible to the local geographical area. However, 
prevention, mitigation and response to terrorist attack reach far beyond the 
boundaries of the law enforcement community. Within the San Francisco JTTF, 
there has been an increased awareness that the emergency medical response 
community, including EMS, haz-mat teams, hospitals and public health 
department are key partners in both preparing for and responding to a terrorist 
event.38  
The San Francisco FBI JTTF is one of few JTTFs that have a medical 
representative. The representative is on a part-time assignment, averaging one 
day a week. He reports directly to the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Coordinator. Responsibilities include liaising the JTTF to the greater San 
                                            
37 Larry A. Mefford, “Congressional Testimony of Associate Special Agent in Charge, San 
Francisco Division, FBI,” Terrorism Preparedness (2002). 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/mefford040202.htm (accessed 12/02/06). 
38 Special Agent Vincent Lucero, FBI San Francisco WMD Coordinator and JTTF Supervisor, 
interviews with author, Oakland, CA, June–September 2005. 
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Francisco Bay Area EMS, fire, public health and hospital community. Other 
duties include coordinating FBI responsibilities with environmental, law 
enforcement, military and the public health and medical communities on projects 
including, but not limited to, the following:39  
BIOWATCH- Covertly located air “sniffing” filters checked daily to detect 
several biological agents throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. 
CHEMPACK- Nerve agent antidote caches strategically located in 
hospitals, fire departments and other strategic areas. 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)- Center for Disease Control assets 
including “push pack” stockpiles of medical supplies, drugs and 
antidotes deployable on short notice. 
RAD-NET- Dozens of fixed radiological detectors giving real-time 
radiological monitoring and warnings throughout Bay area. 
SNIFFER- Deployable “real-time” chemical, WMD and hazardous 
materials detectors for special events and strategic locations. 
National Guard Civil Support Team (CST)- Liaison with specialized 
National Guard unit that have significant WMD response 
capabilities. 
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)- Work with federal teams on 
radiological disaster planning and response. 
FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU)- Work with this 
specialized team for deployments in  support of FBI operations. 
 
The use of a medical and health JTTF member is recognized as a 
significant benefit for the San Francisco FBI. Many members of the medical, fire 
service and general emergency management community have made positive 
comments about the forward vision of the FBI for such inclusion. FBI and DHS 
unclassified bulletins of interest to the medical community are routinely 
disseminated without delay because of this new relationship. The FBI has 
become aware of the specialized medical assets in the community of which they 
                                            
39 Specific details of programs, locations and responsible agencies have been omitted for 
security purposes. 
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were previously unaware. Trusting relationships have been built between the FBI 
and many public safety disciplines because of this endeavor. 
B. STATE INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS 
1. Overview 
States are increasingly creating intelligence fusion centers that 
consolidate multiple law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies. In August 
2005, the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices survey 
ranked the creation of state intelligence fusion centers as the Governors’ second 
highest priority.40 The joint publication from the Department of Justice and 
Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines, serves as a 
template for organizing fusion centers at the state, local and federal levels.  
However, there are major differences in the organization of each fusion 
center. Some state fusion centers have representatives from emergency 
management, fire, rescue and emergency medical services, but most do not. 
Only a few state fusion centers have representation from the state public health 
department. The following map shows the status of states that had at least some 








                                            
40 United States Department of Justice, “Executive Summary: Fusion Center Guidelines” 
(2006), http://www.iir.com/global/products/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf  (accessed 
2/2/07). 
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Figure 1.   Fusion Center Summary 41 
 
2. California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center 
In California, the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) is a 
state fusion center including members from the California Department of Justice, 
the California Highway Patrol and the California Office of Homeland Security 
(OHS). The STTAC provides California’s law enforcement and homeland security 
members with real-time situational awareness of identified threats and 
coordination within the critical infrastructure of the state.  
Senior members of STTAC were approached by the California Emergency 
Medical Services Authority (EMSA) in 2005 to inquire if the STTAC would be 
interested in having an EMSA representative as part of the center. There was 
initial approval for this endeavor. As a show of support, the California Office of 
                                            
41 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, “State and Regional Intelligence Fusion 
Center Contact Information,” http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/state.pdf (accessed 1/29/07). 
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Homeland Security awarded a $622,000 grant over a two-year period to the 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority for staffing and expenses to 
support EMSA as full partner within the STTAC. However, much to the 
consternation of EMSA and the medical community they represent, the STTAC 
senior management decided that STTAC would be a law enforcement only group 
for the time being.42  
According to an STTAC representative, the lack of medical or health 
representation is only a temporary situation and they have all intentions to 
involve EMSA at a later date. Apparently, the STTAC is in the early phase of 
development and plans on expanding to include emergency medical agency 
representation at some point.43 This is not an isolated case. Several other state 
fusion centers have been initially hesitant to incorporate non-law enforcement 
members into their center.  
3. Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center  
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) is a full-time 
fusion center operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It maintains an all-crimes 
approach to terrorism prevention and response. The ACTIC uses cross-
jurisdictional partnerships that integrate local, state and federal law enforcement, 
first responders, public health, emergency management and the private 
sector. The center shares space with the FBI JTTF and the FBI’s Field 
Intelligence Group (FIG).  
The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program Coordinator for ACTIC is a 
firefighter and paramedic by training. He is assigned full-time to the center.44  
                                            
42 Dan Smiley, Chief Deputy Director, California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 
interview with author, December 22, 2006. 
43 Kathryn Grant, Consultant, California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, 
interview with author, December 22, 2006. 
44 Richard Salyers, TLO Program Coordinator, Arizona Counter Terrorism Information 
Center, interview with author, December 27, 2006. 
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Within the TLO program, there are several “levels” of members, all of whom must 
complete a basic, forty-hour TLO training. The highest level TLO is designated 
Level-A; the second is Level-B. 
A Level-A TLO receives a Secret security clearance from the FBI. Level-A 
TLOs are assigned to the ACTIC for forty hours a month. They are provided 
equipment such as vehicles, communication suites, WMD detectors and personal 
protective equipment. In the event of a disaster, Level-A TLOs are deployed to 
the scene to give the ACTIC live situational and tactical awareness. In turn, the 
Level-A TLOs are given terrorism-related information, briefings and bulletins. 
They are encouraged to share unclassified, or “public safety sensitive” reports 
with their respective agencies and disciplines on an as-needed or need-to-know 
basis. The top Level-A TLO includes a public health representative.  
Level-B TLOs are assigned to the ACTIC duties for only half the hours as 
Level-A TLOs. They have fewer responsibilities and a lesser security clearance.  
The ACTIC model of a fusion center is consistently well-regarded in the 
literature. It is often referred to as a truly multi-disciplinary, multi-agency center. It 
is respected for its thorough integration of diverse fields. 
C. LOCAL TERRORISM EARLY WARNING GROUPS 
1. Overview 
Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG)45 are becoming more common 
in urban areas. Federal Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants have been 
issued to support local anti-terrorism initiatives. There are now more than thirty 
urban areas receiving funds to support a local TEWG. The Terrorism Research 
Center published a paper stating that a well-functioning TEWG should meet the  
 
                                            
45 Terrorism Early Warning Group is one name given to this kind of organization. They are 
often referred to as Terrorism Working Groups, Local Intelligence Fusion Centers, Interagency 
Intelligence Analysis Centers or Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers. 
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requirements of the National Preparedness Goals. TEWGs in operation today 
meet most of the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive -8 
(HSPD-8).46  
Typically, TEWGs are coordinated by local or county law enforcement 
agencies. TEWGs strive to identify potential terrorist threats and disseminate 
information and warnings to their constituents and Terrorism Liaison Officers. 
They support prevention, response and recovery efforts and mitigate terrorist 
threats at the local, regional and national levels.  
TEWGs pride themselves on being flexible and modular, reflecting the 
diverse communities and geographies they represent. Some TEWGs offer 
incident management support, operational net assessment, and real-time 
intelligence support to the Incident Commander or an Emergency Operations 
Center. 
2. East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group  
The East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group (EBTEWG) is a joint 
endeavor involving the City of Oakland and the Counties of Alameda and Contra 
Costa in California. Funded mostly by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
grant process, this center has five full-time staff members. The team consists of a 
TEWG Coordinator, two law enforcement officers, an intelligence analyst and a 
firefighter who also acts as an analyst. The mission of the EBTEWG is, “to 
provide regional command (and infrastructure) components with situational 
awareness for terror incident management and to facilitate appropriate 
responses across all levels of government and private sector critical assets.”47  
                                            
46 Ed Reed et al., “Utilizing Terrorism Early Warning Groups to Meet the National 
Preparedness Goals,” Terrorism Research Center (2005). 
47 East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, “Mission Statement” (2007), 
http://www.eastbaytewg.org (accessed 2/03/07). 
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Liaison membership of the EBTEWG includes representatives from public 
safety disciplines including fire departments, EMS, public works, environmental 
health, hospitals, transportation and emergency management. This group makes 
up the Terrorism Liaison Officer outreach program as part of the EBTEWG.  
Its regular medical representatives are a paramedic and a nurse. The 
paramedic, from Alameda County EMS, is the WMD Preparedness Coordinator. 
The nurse, from Contra Costa County, is the Regional Disaster Medical Health 
Specialist (RDMHS). Both members are available on an as-needed basis for 
questions and advice. They average one day a month with the EBTEWG staff. 
Both members work with hospitals, EMS, public health and others in the medical 
health community to offer education related to terrorism and to encourage 
participation in the TLO Program. 
There are currently plans underway to add two more TEWGs in the San 
Francisco Bay area. One, planned for the West Bay, will serve the San Francisco 
area. The other, to be in the South Bay, will serve the San Jose area. Plans are 
in place for a part-time medical/health representative for each. 
3. Joint Regional Intelligence Center of Los Angeles (JRIC) 
The Los Angeles JRIC is an integrated terrorism and criminal intelligence 
fusion center. It is the only model examined that has all elements of a local 
TEWG, a state fusion center and an FBI JTTF operating under one roof. They 
work around the clock producing and disseminating threat summaries and 
bulletins to public and private sector agencies with public safety responsibilities.   
Managed by the FBI, the JRIC has participants from local (Los Angeles 
Police and Sheriff’s Department, the local TEWG) and state law enforcement (CA 
Department of Justice, the Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center 
(RTTAC). Their medical representative is a public health nurse from Los Angeles 
County. He is assigned to the JRIC on a full-time basis and possesses a Secret 
level security clearance. At the time of writing, Top Secret clearance was in 
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progress. He has received training in joint investigation and intelligence analysis. 
The arrangement has been highly functional; according to the local FBI WMD 
Coordinator, “he is an asset and a critical part of the FBI WMD Intelligence 
Program.”48 
D. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM (TLO) 
The Terrorism Liaison Officer Program is a state-wide effort in California 
and is being developed in several other states. The TLO mission is to develop a 
network of trained, coordinated first responders in various disciplines to function 
as the local eyes and ears in the war on terrorism. TLOs operate within the 
framework of a local TEWG or state fusion center and assist in intelligence 
collection. They assist information dissemination to the various disciplines they 
represent.  
TLO programs mirror some of the concepts of community-oriented 
policing. Because TLOs work in fields ranging from law enforcement, to 
firefighting, emergency medicine and public health, their official duties immerse 
them in the local populous on a regular basis. Their job placement may increase 
the likelihood of detecting possible terrorist planning activities. This “force 
multiplier” augments the existing resources and efforts, and encompasses non-
law enforcement disciplines.  
TLO training includes developing skills for recognizing possible indicators 
of terrorist support groups and planning activities. In California, the TLO program 
includes forty hours of training. TLOs access a secure TEWG website to maintain 
membership communication as well as report tips and leads. The TLO network 
meets with its associated TEWG on a regular basis, for training, updates and 
networking. 
                                            
48 Kristine A. Beardsley, FBI Special Agent and WMD Coordinator, interview by author, 
December 12, 2006. 
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When suspicious activities are not reported to the local police or the FBI’s 
JTTF, they may be reported to the local TEWG. In the TEWG, tips and leads are 
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V. PROPOSED VISION OF MEDICAL/HEALTH 
REPRESENTATION IN FUSION CENTERS.  
Any change, even a change for the better, is always accompanied 
by drawbacks and discomforts.  
– Enoch Arnold Bennett 
A. IMPORTANTANCE OF THE VISION 
The inclusion of medical representatives on FBI JTTFs, state fusion 
centers, TEWG and TLO programs is crucial. In the fight against terrorism, law 
enforcement efforts alone consist of only part of the solution. Response to a 
terrorist attack requires the coordinated efforts of many public safety disciplines. 
If these disciplines have been collaborating already through the fusion center 
process, then positive dynamics formed during the daily routing would carry over 
in times of crisis.  
Public safety agents can bring important information to fusion centers, 
especially in sharing intelligence about suspicious criminal activity, disease 
trends, local drug activity, prescription drug fraud and epidemiological 
investigations. It is critical for medical agencies to be included in the information 
network for warnings, alerts and reports on activities that may impact emergency 
medical and public health services directly. 
Public sentiment is backed by numerous post-9/11 governmental reports, 
all indicating a widespread call for better inter-agency coordination.49, 50 
Catastrophic event preparedness must include a medical element if response is 
to be complete and effective. In the event of bioterrorist or other WMD attack, the 
medical community would have close working relationships with law enforcement 
and other anti-terrorism agencies. The ‘unified command’ concept that is 
                                            
49 Butler 2002. 
50  Hamilton 2004. 
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stressed in the fusion center model should bring together all of the key disciplines 
with responsibilities for the care and wellbeing of the public. Strong working 
relationships between medical professionals and law enforcement has helped in 
epidemiological investigations as well as criminal investigations. This was 
demonstrated during the anthrax attacks of 2001 when medical and criminal 
investigators worked together.51 
Even those who believe that further terrorist attacks are unlikely on 
American soil recognize the importance of integrated emergency response 
preparation. Interagency cooperation is valuable in preparation for non-terrorist 
disasters as well. Cross-discipline trainings and exercises facilitated through the 
fusion center process will help in general disaster preparedness and response 
efforts. 
There are substantial terrorism response plans for emergency response 
agencies. However, EMS and the larger medical community have not yet 
embraced prevention efforts as germane to their mission. The fusion center 
process can facilitate terrorism prevention strategies with the medical and health 
community using such vehicles as the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program. 
1. Hypothetical Medical Scenarios 
Much like police detective work, medical practitioners interview patients, 
witnesses, family members and others to gain information about a medical 
situation. At times, a patient’s account of what happened does not coincide with 
the medical presentation. There are many possible reasons this can occur. 
Inconsistent stories can be told in cases of embarrassing situations, confusion or 
criminal activity. Medical practitioners develop skills to help them determine the 
accuracy and honesty of those being interviewed. This skill could also be 
employed in identifying criminal or terrorism planning activities.   
                                            
51 Butler 2002. 
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The following three hypothetical scenarios should cause a medical 
practitioner to become curious, if not suspicious. While these cases may not 
necessarily rise to the level of calling 911, they may be suspicious enough to 
warrant exploration by an official. 
Scenario 1: During a home “healthy baby program” visit, a public health 
nurse notices a closet full of emergency responder uniforms (police, fire, EMS). 
She is certain that no one in the family is an emergency responder. She vaguely 
remembers reading in the newspaper about individuals stealing public safety 
uniforms to gain access to emergency sites. 
Scenario 2: EMS is called to the scene of an individual with burns to his 
hands. He claims the burns are from spilling hot water, but upon close inspection, 
the burn pattern resembles those associated with a chemical blister agent, not 
scalding.  
Scenario 3: A patient in the Emergency Department has diarrhea, nausea, 
vomiting, hair loss and general malaise. All tests for bacterial and viral infection 
are negative. There is no indication of chemotherapy or radiation treatment. The 
Emergency Department physician questions the patient about exposure to 
radiation. The patient is very nervous and denies any connection to a radiation 
source. 
These cases illustrate a few ways in which the integration of medical 
professionals into the intelligence fusion process may benefit the war on 
terrorism. None of the above scenarios requires reporting to the authorities. 
There is no conclusive data to support that laws have been broken. In fact, all 
three scenarios may have plausible, legal explanations.  
If medical personnel have been trained in terrorism precursor recognition 
and are part of a Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, then situations such as 
those described above would be more likely to be reported into a local fusion 
center for further analysis and follow up.  
 
48 
2. Relationship Building Prior to a Catastrophic Event 
During the disaster is a bad time to be handing out business cards.  
– Anonymous 
There are numerous examples of crisis situations that were successfully 
mitigated, at least partially attributed to the good working relationships of those 
involved. Multi-agency and multi-discipline training and exercises facilitate a 
working relationship that should translate into operational applications. Task 
Forces, working groups and intelligence fusion centers provide a forum for 
professional relationships to develop.  
The multi-agency, multi-discipline response to the Pentagon attack on 
9/11 was generally viewed as successful, according to the official After Action 
Report.52 Members of the responding agencies had a history of joint planning, 
interagency coordination and mutual aid experience. They also had what may be 
viewed as the most important asset of all: good personal relationships. The FBI, 
Pentagon officials, medical responders, fire departments and local law 
enforcement had cultivated formal and informal relationships over years. This led 
to a natural development of mutual understanding between them. Moreover, 
there was a useful comprehension of what other disciplines offered in crisis. 
Unfortunately, such an example of good working relationships and mutual 
respect is not present in many communities. 
Longstanding animosity and competition between agencies has been an 
obstacle to successful integration in some cases. Conflicts may exist between 
local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Fire departments and law  
enforcement traditionally have had inter-agency relationship problems. Prior to 
9/11, intelligence and law enforcement conflicts and lack of communication were 
a marked problem.  
                                            
52 George Washington University, “Response Actions to the Attack on Pentagon- General 
Observations,” Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management (2002). 
http://www.gwu.edu/~icdrm/publications/nsf911/response.html (accessed 11/15/06).  
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State fusion centers, local TEWGs and FBI JTTFs are excellent 
opportunities to diminish interagency conflicts while increasing effectiveness for 
the public good. When members work directly with representatives from other 
disciplines toward a common goal, greater acceptance and trust naturally 
accrues.  
3. Information Dissemination to the Medical and Health 
Community 
State fusion centers, TEWGs and FBI JTTFs should provide intelligence 
information, reports, warning and alerts to the medical and health communities in 
a timely manner. This would allow for protective action to be taken for the benefit 
of associated facilities, patients, staff and public safety representatives. 
Hospitals, EMS and the public health system can increase their capacity to 
manage a surge of patients, but it takes time. The more time the medical 
community has to prepare, the more lives can be saved.  
Intelligence about early phase terrorist planning activities should be given 
to medical representatives. Their expertise should be utilized in such cases. For 
example, if an intelligence fusion center had information about an attempt to 
develop a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb”, medical representatives 
could assist by increasing security on medical radio-isotopes. The medical 
facilities could then notify physicians to be alert to patients exhibiting burns or 
sickness related to radiation exposure. The medical community could also 
monitor requests, purchases or theft of anti-radiation medicines. This kind of 
interaction between law enforcement and the medical community is almost non-
existent today. 
Most medical representatives are recipients of several health discipline 
information streams such as list serves, publications and news bulletins. Most 
law enforcement members know little or nothing about this open source medical 
intelligence. Some of these bulletins are worthy of widened dissemination and 
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further analysis. This information should be filtered, brought into the fusion center 
for analysis and then further disseminated when necessary.  
A recent noteworthy issue has been fraudulent and suspicious hospital 
inspectors. Some have pretended to be from the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). There have been dozens of 
cases over the last few years reported to JCAHO and the FBI. In 2004, fifteen 
hospitals in Illinois reported suspicious incidents pertaining to hospital security, 
bioterrorism preparedness and staffing questions. Through its network of JTTFs, 
the FBI and Department of Homeland Security found a national pattern emerging 
that warranted the creation and release of an unclassified/for official use only 
(FOUO) informational bulletin in April, 2005.  This was disseminated to many, but 
not all, healthcare organizations. This kind of important information would be 
more likely to get to the medical community in a timely manner if there was a 
medical and health representative in the respective FBI JTTFs and fusion 
centers. 
4. Medical Expertise within Intelligence Fusion Centers 
Having a medical expert available within the fusion center should facilitate 
better information dissemination and communication with the medical community, 
but there other benefits as well. There are many situations where medically 
related issues are relevant to investigations, such as with chemical or biological 
terrorist agents. It would be advantageous to have a medical expert readily 
available.  
There are several models of medical involvement within the intelligence 
community. At FBI headquarters in Washington, DC, there is now a Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) physician assigned in a full-time capacity.53 His role is 
                                            
53 Butler 2002. 
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two-fold: to liaise with the greater medical community and to give advice on 
matters of communicable disease and biological agents.54  
The Department of Homeland Security now has a Chief Medical Officer. In 
addition to giving the Director of Homeland Security medically specific advice, he 
is responsible for coordinating biodefense activities, pandemic flu planning and 
insuring a unified approach to medical planning and response.55 
A few state fusion centers have medical reach-back capacity by having a 
contact within a state health department. If the health department individual is 
available, fusion centers can get medically related questions answered. This is 
not an ideal situation as it relies on phone calls and indeterminate availability. 
Some TEWGs have liaison officer positions filled from the medical disciplines as 
part of their staff. These people may be able to answer questions or make 
opinions on intelligence matters from a medical perspective.  
Emergency medical field personnel, who are members of a fusion center 
can provide information that could help the fusion center get accurate situational 
and tactical awareness. If a potential terrorist threatened a planned public event, 
public safety officials could augment law enforcement assets. For instance, at 
sporting events, festivals, and demonstrations, vetted public safety members 
could be used as a “force multiplier” to provide more eyes on the ground. This 
would help funnel accurate strategic and tactical information from the field to 
fusion centers. 
B. MEDICAL DISCIPLINE REPRESENTATION IN INTELLIGENCE FUSION 
CENTERS 
The placement of a medical representative in a fusion center requires 
careful selection. The job requires more from a candidate than a medical 
background alone. Medical orientation, perspective and biases are just a few of 
                                            
54 Butler 2002. 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Medical Officer, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0880.shtm (accessed 1/10/07). 
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the many factors that should be considered in the selection process when 
implementing an effective model of medical inclusion. 
This section will describe the general categories within the overall medical 
community. Strengths, limitations and appropriateness will be discussed 
according to medical discipline. Applicability to the fusion center process will be 
reviewed. 
1. Public Health 
Public health has only recently been viewed as an important partner with 
law enforcement in the field of homeland security. As homeland security and 
emergency management have evolved, many public health officials have been 
left out. However, the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the ongoing threat of 
bioterrorism is quickly changing the relationship between public health and 
homeland security officials.  
The authority of public health is becoming recognized as an integral part 
of homeland security preparedness. It claims unique capabilities in terms of 
quarantine, disease surveillance, infectious disease knowledge and mass 
prophylaxis authority. In most states, it is public health that has the power to 
close businesses, enforce medical treatment regimes and issue quarantine and 
isolation orders related to disease control. 
However, a culture clash exists between public health and other 
emergency response disciplines. Public health officials usually work in controlled, 
respectful circles, often having the luxury of taking the time to make decisions 
with careful consideration to all options, striving for congenial consensus 
whenever possible. Critical time pressure is usually not an issue. This has 
caused problems, especially in crisis situations.  
During the 2000 TOPOFF federal exercise simulating a mass outbreak of 
Yersina Pestis, or pneumonic plague, observers noted that public health officials 
seemed paralyzed and unable to make critical decisions with less than ideal 
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intelligence. One observer commented, “The time frame that public health is 
accustomed to dealing with is not what is needed for bioterrorism [response].”56  
Public health has only recently become engaged in emergency 
management, chain of command appreciation and the incident command 
system. The learning curve for public health involvement in emergency 
management is steep and it will not be long before they are prepared to fully 
engage in terrorism prevention and response efforts. 
However, some public health members may not be in favor of involvement 
in a fusion center or Terrorism Liaison Officer Program. Integrated terrorism 
prevention efforts require sharing information that was not typically practiced in 
the past. The role of the public health department is to insure the health and 
wellbeing of the community, not supply law enforcement with information.  
Many of the recipients of basic public health services are low income 
families living with low levels of employment and high levels of crime. Drug 
addiction, alcoholism and sexually transmitted diseases are just a few health 
issues that public health addresses on a daily basis. As such, the goals of public 
health often conflict with those of law enforcement.  
Historically, public health departments have been reluctant to report minor 
criminal activity or the immigration status of its constituents. Patients with criminal 
backgrounds are hesitant to seek care from public health if they are in jeopardy 
of being reported to law enforcement. Therefore, public health and others in the 
medical community may not perceive their role as that of general crime-reducing 
efforts, much less terrorism prevention. 
                                            
56 T.V. Inglesby et al., “A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF,” Journal of 
Clinical Infectious Diseases 32 (2001). 
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2. Emergency Medical Services 
Emergency Medical Services work in the community with the sick and 
injured as a matter of course. As such, it may be a good source of qualified 
medical individuals to include in fusion centers since they already work with law 
enforcement on a regular basis.  
Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) are considered 
generalists; they posses a good understanding of general medical knowledge on 
a wide range of topics. They are trained to excel under stress. EMS personnel 
work in chaotic and dangerous environments: crime scenes, major accidents and 
catastrophic events with mass casualties. Because of their close contact with 
hospital emergency departments, public health, fire departments and law 
enforcement, they tend to have good working relationships with these agencies.  
Many large EMS agencies have a Disaster Preparedness Coordinator or 
Terrorism and WMD medical educator as part of their managerial staff. This type 
of individual may have the right mix of skills to fill the medical health 
representative position on a fusion center.  
3. Other Medical Disciplines 
Many qualifications must be considered when selecting a health 
representative for a fusion center. Background, education and training are a few.  
Medical disciplines other than those described above should be 
considered for involvement in fusion centers. A regional hospital group 
representative may be a good candidate because their skills are appropriate to a 
Terrorism Liaison Officer Program.  
Experience such as prior military, law enforcement, hazardous materials 
and/or WMD expertise would also be applicable. Of course, an advanced degree 
in Homeland Security, Security Studies or related fields such as International 
Relations should be strongly considered in the process of selection. 
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The surveys show that representatives from several medical disciplines 
have been successfully integrated into fusion centers. Medical disciplines vary in 
their orientation and perspective, and this should be considered, along with 
several other factors in the selection of medical fusion center membership. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS AND ISSUES 
1. Selection, Vetting and Security Clearances 
The selection of a representative from the medical community for an FBI 
JTTF, state fusion center or local TEWG is a critical decision that should be 
made with careful consideration. The task carries great responsibilities. This 
person or group of people would be representing the interests of the greater 
medical and health community.  
The medical representative would offer medical opinions, acting as the “go 
to guy” for medical and WMD-related terrorism investigations. He would need to 
know where and how to rapidly gain appropriate information to complete tasks. 
Therefore, the selected individual must have the respect, trust and support from 
the greater medical community. He would need to be well-versed in a number of 
medical disciplines, including Emergency Medical Services operations, public 
health, epidemiology, hospital emergency medicine, hazardous materials, 
toxicology and the medical implications of weapons of mass destruction. He must 
demonstrate a grasp of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), the 
National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and many other federal programs related to terrorism and mass 
casualties.  
The role of medical liaison could be created with a middle or senior 
manager in public health or EMS. A County Health Officer, EMS Director or 
Director of Public Health may have the knowledge and skills for the job. 
However, individuals in these positions might find it difficult to commit to the 
duties and schedule on a regular basis.  
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The agency that approves and authorizes an individual for these 
assignments must appreciate the time commitment and importance of the 
mission. They must realize that some information may be classified as Secret or 
Top Secret or may be available on a “need-to-know” basis and may not be 
shared. While this may seem a significant obstacle, most of the information and 
analysis in fusion centers is based on open source intelligence (OSINT) and can 
be shared with supervisors and others. After all, one of the major tenants of 
intelligence fusion center efforts is to share pertinent information, warnings and 
alerts to the public safety community in a timely manner. 
Membership on an FBI JTTF requires that Top Secret clearance be 
obtained for access to FBI databases, FBI communications equipment and FBI 
intranet email accounts.  
State fusion centers are less consistent on the security clearance issue. 
Many state fusion center law enforcement members possess a Top Secret 
clearance, some have Secret and others have none. The Los Angeles TEW co-
locates some of its members based on security clearance levels. 
2. Liaison, Part-time and Full-time Assignments 
A spectrum of options exist medical representative on a taskforce in terms 
of time commitment, schedule and expectations. Each taskforce, JTTF, fusion 
center and TEWG has to work out the best system of time management for each 
respective agency. A full-time assignment may be ideal; however, based on the 
surveys, it is apparent that most fusion centers have successfully arranged a 
part-time assignment with their medical and health members.  
3. Training and Orientation 
One would think that involvement and membership in any of the federal, 
state or local fusion centers would require a consistent, comprehensive training 
regime for potential members. However, as illustrated in the fusion center survey 
results, that is not the case.  
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In California, the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program has a forty-hour 
training program prerequisite for TLO membership.57  In some cases, no formal 
training is required. For instance, the San Francisco FBI JTTF membership 
requires a significant security investigation and a MOU with the member agency, 
but no formal training is required. A training curriculum should be developed for 
medical and health representatives within fusion centers. This should be a future 
research project in and of itself. 
4. Patient Confidentiality Issues 
Those who work in the medical field are familiar with federal patient 
confidentiality laws. The Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA) 
is the primary law pertaining to this issue. This law and others like it protect the 
privacy of patients by prohibiting public disclosures that might identify a specific 
patient’s Protected Health Information (PHI). In the medical community, it has 
been a long-honored tradition to uphold patient privacy without federal legislature 
mandating such actions. However, some situations legally obligate medical 
practitioners to report certain diseases and medical conditions to local public 
health. These include reporting of suspected bioterrorism agents, some 
communicable diseases, and the vague, but useful category of “occurrence of 
any unusual disease”.58  
The list of reportable diseases and conditions, as edited in September 
2005, does not specifically include nerve agent exposure or its broader category,  
organophosphate poisoning. Nor does it include other WMD agents such as 
blister agents (mustard gas), or cyanide. These conditions could, however, be 
considered an “occurrence of an unusual disease” and should be reported to 
public health officials.  
                                            
57 The forty-hour TLO training is required for all TLO programs in California and Arizona as of 
12/06. 
58 California Code of Regulations, Title 17, “Reportable Diseases and Conditions,” edited 
9/05. 
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Patient medical records and other private medical information is 
accessible to public health officials and is not subject to general HIPAA rules.59 
“The HIPAA Privacy Rule recognizes the legitimate need for public health 
authorities and others responsible for insuring public health and safety to have 
access to protected health information to carry out their public health mission.”60 
Public health officials should in turn notify law enforcement if a crime or 
suspicions justify it. When contacted about this issue, a senior public health 
official claimed confidence that information would promptly be passed to the FBI 
in the event of the report of a suspicious illness, especially one indicating a 
possible terrorist nexus. This would include sharing personal medical information 
with law enforcement officials.61 
Medical practitioners are required to report suspicions of crimes such as 
child, elder and domestic abuse. They must also report injuries appearing to be 
caused by a firearm. However, reporting guidelines are less clear for medical 
practitioners who suspect possible terrorism. If a paramedic saw canisters of 
cyanide, a bomb-making book and jihad posters in the garage of a patient’s 
home, it would only be matter of minutes before law enforcement, bomb squad 
and a hazardous material team would be on scene. If, however, the paramedic 
saw a box full of electronic timers and a bomb-making book, the guidance is less 
clear.  
The line between odd and suspicious activities and issues of national 
security is not clear. Individual judgment determines what information is reported 
to law enforcement, in the opinion of a former FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Coordinator.62 It is reasonable to suggest that a patient’s PHI is not at risk of 
                                            
59 OCR HIPAA Privacy, “Disclosure for Public Health Activities” (2003), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/publichealth.pdf.pdf  (accessed 1/12/07). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Anthony Iton, MD, MPH, JD, Alameda County Public Health Director, County Health 
Officer, interview with author, January 2, 2007 
62 Daniel Butler, FBI Supervisory Agent, former San Francisco FBI WMD Coordinator, 
interview with author, January 3, 2007. 
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discovery just by the fact that a medic reports a suspicious occurrence in a 
location the patient was found. In other words, the field medical provider is free to 
report to law enforcement a suspected crime that has nothing to do with the 
medical condition the patient presents. It would be analogous to an EMS team 
discovering a methamphetamine lab on the premises of the victim they were 
called to treat.  
There may still be potential issues regarding the sharing of personal 
medical information with law enforcement. Legal counsel should be consulted 


























We should not only use the brains we have, but all that we can 
borrow.  
– Thomas Woodrow Wilson 
A. GENERAL FINDINGS 
Intelligence fusion centers at all levels of government would be enhanced 
with the inclusion of public safety representation. The strategy canvas below 
(Figure 4) shows in graphic form that public safety members bring value in many 
important areas compared to current law enforcement-only fusion center models.  
 
Figure 2.   Strategy Canvas comparing intelligence fusion centers with and without 
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There are various options for creating an effective, new policy for 
healthcare representation in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, state 
intelligence fusion centers, Terrorism Early Warning Groups and Terrorism 
Liaison Officer Programs. Alliances between these groups would mean 
substantial involvement of the medical community in intelligence analysis and 
information dissemination. Through the research and analysis process, a cogent 
model for implementation of these ideas has emerged.  
There is little precedent for a broad-sweeping national effort of this kind, 
even though literature shows support and recommendations for the initiative.  
Sporadic efforts at the local level have shown mixed results. The success 
of integrated programming depends on several factors, not least of which 
includes the acceptance by the law enforcement-based intelligence centers to 
have non-law enforcement members involved in their efforts.  It should be made 
clear that some law enforcement officials are extremely hesitant about bringing 
“non-sworn” disciplines into their fold. Additionally, some medical and health 
members are not interested in involvement with law enforcement anti-terrorism 
efforts. It will take significant teamwork and patience to completely integrate the 
medical and health community into the intelligence fusion process. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This section describes several potential policy options for the integration of 
medical and health professionals within intelligence fusion centers. Advantages, 
disadvantages and recommendations of each option are included. 
1. Policy Option A 
This policy option calls for no official change in the status quo, but 
encourages ongoing sharing of information through informal channels. Effective, 
informal relationships between law enforcement and medical entities already 
exist in many communities. In the case of an eminent threat to a medical facility, 
for example, it would be assumed, but not mandated, that notifications would go 
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out to the relevant parties. It would also be assumed that resources would be 
allocated to protect and support medical facilities.  
There are several benefits to this option. First, implementation would be 
straightforward. Secondly, it would require little or no allocation of additional 
financial resources. Some actionable intelligence may possibly make it to 
relevant groups in a timely manner. 
Of course, such an unstructured policy has many drawbacks. Without 
formal relationships governing and securing communication between agencies, 
there would be no assurance that the medical community would receive 
meaningful intelligence. In cases of incorrect or incomplete sharing, there would 
not be accountability. Moreover, since the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities would have no formal responsibility to share information, judgment 
of the model’s effectiveness would be purely subjective. Evaluations would 
therefore be based on the input and experiences of both parties. In many ways, 
this policy option is the status quo, and according to the literature and research, 
inadequate.  
2. Policy Option B 
This policy option would require a reorganization of the entire intelligence 
fusion center concept. It would revamp the makeup of intelligence centers to 
include multiple representatives from several public safety disciplines, including 
assorted relevant medical disciplines. For example, individuals would be 
assigned from hospitals, public health, EMS, the fire service, medical labs and 
environmental health. These representatives would procure the necessary 
security clearances to be part of the intelligence program. They would be trained 
to function as analysts with a specific focus on the discipline they represent.  
Several challenges come with the implementation of this scenario. First, it 
would require far more financial backing in comparison to Policy Option A. 
Procuring security clearance for a large number of individuals would be time-
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consuming and expensive. The cost of personnel time would need to be 
absorbed by the participating agencies, and those positions would need to be 
back-filled, adding additional costs. 
Aside from practical implementation issues, it would be imperative to 
bridge differences in culture between the disciplines. Expert medical vantage 
points may not receive immediate respect by established law enforcement and 
intelligence members. This may undermine support from the intelligence sector. 
Power dynamics would shift with the structure of the system with an unknown 
benefit. 
3. Policy Option C 
This plan balances Policy Options A and B. Instead of multiple and varied 
health representatives, only one or two medical/ health representatives would be 
placed in the intelligence agency or fusion center. This individual would be 
responsible for bringing the knowledge of the many diverse, health-oriented fields 
such as EMS, fire, hospital and public health. This option would require the 
assignment of an experienced and well-respected medical professional with 
training in intelligence to a pre-existing fusion center.  
The duties of this individual would be two-fold. The primary responsibility 
would be to review and make recommendations on existing data and raw 
intelligence, giving emphasis to medical and health implications. The other 
obligation would be to assist in the information flow between intelligence, law 
enforcement and the medical community, including public health. This person 
would work with fusion center command staff to determine who would be privy to 
intelligence information related to terrorism. This person would be involved in the 
format, content and mechanism for dissemination of messages.  
This suggested policy aims to support anti-terrorism efforts by assisting 
collaboration between various emergency response agencies. The benefit of the 
healthcare representative’s work with the intelligence community would be 
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evaluated based on interviews and surveys of applicable individuals.  The 
assignment to the fusion center could be full-time, part-time, or even an ad-hoc 
liaison position. In the surveys, several fusion centers reported that a part-time 
assignment was ideal for a medical and health representative. The important 
concept is formal involvement and relationship-building prior to a catastrophic 
event. 
Policy Option C is the most cost-effective solution to the information 
problems pointed out in the 9/11 Commission Report and many other documents 
referenced in the literature. Progress has been made in intelligence sharing 
within law enforcement and should seamlessly expand to include the medical 
field, as is the case in some fusion centers.  
4. Policy Option D   
Research and analysis clearly advocate intelligence fusion centers fully 
integrate public safety disciplines, including the medical and health community. In 
addition to this initiative, local emergency medical communities and public health 
departments could successfully join fusion center efforts by supporting and 
becoming and active participant in a Terrorism Liaison Officer Program.  
Implementation of the plan to involve the medical community into the 
fusion center process, including the TLO Program needs to be a well-considered 
and phased approach, supported by all parties involved as well as the public.  
Strong leadership, guidance and support from both the law enforcement 
and medical fields are critical for success. Specifically, the fusion center should 
identify one or two leaders in the medical field to devise an initial strategy for 
involving the greater medical community. Eventual expansion into the medical 
community must then include a brainstorming meeting of the key stakeholders. 
Before full implementation of a medical TLO program, involved agencies should 
seek legal review. They must ensure they have support from elected officials.  
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A pilot program with a few select individuals from the medical field may be 
the best course of action. It should consist of individuals who are willing to take 
the forty-hour TLO training program and commit to a long process of 
implementation.  
Initially, the best medical TLOs recruits may be EMS field personnel and 
the hospital emergency staff. These groups tend to have good working relations 
with law enforcement. They are already accustomed to the mandated reporting of 
such crimes as elder and child abuse, shootings and stabbings and other illicit 
activities. Prior to admission into the TLO program, applicants should be vetted. 
Supervisor approval should be procured. A basic background check should be 
completed before access is granted to the secure website. 
TLO training includes an extensive overview of the terrorist activities and 
potential threats. The program includes training in the recognition of terrorism 
planning activities. Training is designed to increase awareness of criminal 
terrorist support activities such as illegal cigarette sales, pirated and counterfeit 
DVD and CD sales and drug dealing, all of which have been linked to known 
terrorist groups funding actions.63 
After completion of the TLO program, the medical representatives can 
bring a value-added benefit back to their respective agencies. Thus, fellow 
employees can be trained during in-services. This allows natural support for the 
growth of the program. TLO members receive “For Official Use Only” bulletins via 
email and some of these can be passed onto relevant supervisors on a need-to-
know basis. This will likely garner support from supervisors since they will be 
receiving information otherwise not readily available to them.  
Once the project is widened and fully implemented, the community will 
need to accept that its first responders have additional responsibilities as 
intelligence sensors on top of their life-saving duties. In general, there is no 
                                            
63 Arron Edens, FBI JTTF, “Criminal Activity Supporting Terrorism” (paper presented to the 
East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, Dublin, California, December 6, 2006). 
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significant opposition to this shift. The essential element of community 
acceptance is early involvement and assurances of objectivity and integrity. If the 
TLO Program is successful, then a more complete model of medical and health 
involvement in the fusion center can emerge.  
5. Policy Option Recommendation 
Ideally, Policy Options C and D should be implemented together since 
they are mutually beneficial. Policy Option C would formally place one to two 
medical representatives in the fusion center as active members of the core team. 
He or she should work closely with or even manage the TLO Program as 
described in Policy Option D.  
The TLO Program needs an active member of the fusion center as its 
point of contact. It should be someone familiar with the medical discipline who 
can ensure smooth communication between those in the field and the center. A 
well-managed TLO Program would empower multiple medical and health 
disciplines to be active intelligence collectors within the communities they serve.  
Many in the medical community are interested in becoming more engaged 
in anti-terrorism efforts and are ready to engage in a TLO Program. Several 
medical TLO Programs are under development. TLOs need training, support and 
a reliable contact within the fusion center who understands the environment in 
which medical TLOs work. As vital sensors in the war on terror, the medical 
health community and its TLOs are valuable resources that are too important to 
be overlooked. 
Policy Option C puts forth a format for substantive involvement of a 
medical representative in a fusion center. Implementation of this option brings 
expertise, a network of specialists and contacts for accurate information 
dissemination to the medical and health community.  
The literature review shows strong support for this endeavor. As the 
surveys and interviews have illustrated, fusion centers boasting a medical 
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component are pleased with the results. The Arizona Counter Terrorism 
Information Center has an active TLO Program including representation from 
several medical and health disciplines. The coordinator of this program is a 
paramedic who is the full-time representative to the center. This should be 
recognized by other centers as a “smart practice” worthy of consideration. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The best way to escape from a problem is to solve it. 
– Alan Saporta 
A. SUMMARY 
The link between the literature, survey results, interviews and the policy 
options is cogent. The literature gives specific guidelines for the substantive 
inclusion of non-law enforcement public safety representation, including medical 
and health disciplines, in the intelligence fusion center process. The 
comprehensive Fusion Center Guidelines document produced by the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security provides a step-by-step 
process to form effective, multi-disciplinary, multi-agency fusion centers at all 
levels of government.  
Surveys and interviews conducted as part of the research included 
federal, state and local fusion centers. In them, it was discovered that centers 
having medical and health representation are all pleased with the integration of 
their important resource. Interviews with law enforcement fusion center 
managers confirmed that having a representative was “critical and integral” to the 
overall counter-terrorism strategy.64 Fusion centers that do not have a medical 
component may not know what they are missing. 
Fusion centers need to be made aware of the benefits of having a medical 
and health representative as part of the center. They should be advised of the 
strong recommendations and specific guidelines from the many government 
documents advocating medical incorporation into the intelligence process. 
                                            
64 Kristine A. Beardsley, FBI Special Agent, WMD Coordinator, interview by author, 
December 12, 2006. 
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The policy options outline several ways to transition current intelligence 
systems into more inclusive models. Policy Option C and D are mutually 
supportive and should be considered together. The presence of formal medical 
and health representatives will enhance the network of medical Terrorism Liaison 
Officers in the community. The surveys showed multiple successful models of 
Policy Option C and D working well as a combined effort. 
There are several models for effective medical representation within fusion 
centers. According to each fusion center, there is a wide range of duties and time 
commitment assignments. The few FBI JTTFs that include a medical taskforce 
officer at all have consistently chosen paramedics to fill this role. Meanwhile, 
those state fusion centers that have a medical and health representatives 
generally use Public Health Nurses to fill this role. This appears to be the de-
facto model for state fusion centers. Local Terrorism Early Warning Groups have 
had the most comprehensive involvement of non-law enforcement disciplines, 
including multiple representatives from several medical disciplines. There are 
several successful examples of this model. 
Interestingly, when speaking with FBI JTTF members and public health 
officials about including medical representation into the intelligence process, 
many authorities had the same response. In interviews, the same comment was 
repeated: “What a great idea! Why haven’t we thought of this earlier?”65,66 
The 2001 anthrax laced letters was, in effect, a warning to public health 
and law enforcement officials that served to indicate the relevance of pre-event 
collaboration. The medical implications of weapons of mass destruction are 
profound. All agencies would benefit in their prevention, preparedness, response 
and recovery efforts by including the medical and health community.  
                                            
65 Anthony Iton, MD, MPH, JD, Alameda County Health Officer, interview with author, June 
15, 2006. 
66 Vincent Lucero, San Francisco FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force WMD Coordinator, 
interview with author, August 6, 2006. 
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At the federal level, the intelligence community is making great strides in 
interagency coordination, collaboration and information dissemination. While only 
a handful of JTTFs and fusion centers have a medical or public health 
representation on the team, it is fast becoming a positive trend. 
Support has been found from representatives in the medical, law 
enforcement and intelligence communities for this effort. Medical involvement 
could take many forms with various degrees of involvement. It can range from an 
ad-hoc, liaison “reach-back” relationship to a more formal, full-time assignment, 
or any creative medium which suits the needs of the participating agencies and 
members.  
Therefore, each fusion center will determine the specific nature of its 
relationship with the medical world. Despite implementation obstacles, the 
literature and surveys both indicate interdisciplinary support for this broad 
initiative. Concerns that will be clarified in practice include the following: 
credentialing, training, security clearances, time commitment and specific 
responsibilities. On a case-by-case basis, each fusion center will determine the 
most suitable representative from the wide range of medical disciplines. The 
factors governing such assignments will vary based on the each fusion center’s 
mission and focus.  
The early successes of a number of FBI JTTFs, state fusion centers and 
local TEWGs should be looked to for guidance. Smart practices for the inclusion 
of medical representatives can come from these centers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While there is no set of universally accepted guidelines for smart practice, 
common themes have emerged. Specific recommendations should be worked 
out as well as basic job descriptions for new medical and health representatives.  
General functions, such as information dissemination and analytical 
support, are widely accepted as baseline responsibilities. Some individual fusion 
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centers have detailed job duties specific to their need. For example, the medical/ 
health representative in the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is 
responsible for managing the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program. Research is 
needed to identify specific responsibilities to be standardized throughout the 
industry.  
Within each fusion center, distinct processes have shaped the role of the 
medical representative. Based on these unique needs, fusion centers select 
matching members from various medical disciplines: public health, fire 
department and emergency medical services. One state fusion center has a 
veterinarian as its representative.  The process of selecting a representative, 
vetting, attaining security clearance and training is variable. Research 
investigating the variances and similarities among fusion centers would benefit 
the field with a catalog of best practices and recommendations.  
The integration of medical and health representation into fusion centers 
has had much success across the country at all levels of government. While 
more work is necessary to fully realize the goal, the potential counter-terrorism 
benefit for the country is worth the effort. The safety and protection of the 
homeland is our premier responsibility, and what is offered in this paper is a 
vision of an attainable, cost-effective enhancement to current law enforcement 
efforts. This is an exciting field for potential research. New and groundbreaking 
endeavors such as this are open for ideas, direction and the development of best 
practices. 
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